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SUMMARY
Cyprus has been divided since 1974.
Greek Cypriots, nearly 80% of the population,
live in the southern two thirds of the island.
Turkish Cypriots live in the “Turkish Republic
of Northern Cyprus” (recognized only by
Turkey), with about 30,000 Turkish troops
providing security.  U.N. peacekeeping forces
maintain a buffer zone between the two.
Since the late 1970s, the U.N., with U.S.
support, has promoted negotiations aimed at
creating a federal, bicommunal, bizonal repub-
lic on Cyprus.  The two sides would pledge
not to move toward union with any other
country.  This reflects concerns that Greek
Cypriots would like to unite with Greece and
that Turkish Cypriots seek to partition the
island, linking the north to Turkey.
The Secretary General’s April 5, 1992
“Set of Ideas” was a framework for negotia-
tions for an overall settlement. The Security
Council implied that Turkish Cypriot leader
Rauf Denktash was responsible.  It then called
for confidence-building measures (CBMs).
Glafcos Clerides was elected president of the
Republic of Cyprus in February 1993.  Both
sides eventually accepted CBMs in principle,
but did not agree on Secretary General’s
proposed method for recording clarifications.
A January 4, 1997 confirmation that
Greek Cypriots would acquire Russian S-300
missiles prompted the United States to deplore
the purchase and Turkey to threaten military
action to prevent deployment and to bond
closer to Turkish Cyprus.  The missiles were
the focus of intense crisis prevention efforts.
On December 29, 1998, Clerides decided not
to deploy the missiles on Cyprus. 
The prospect of Cyprus’s European
Union accession triggered heightened interna-
tional attention to Cyprus and complicated
settlement efforts.  The U.N. hosted inconclu-
sive talks in July and August 1997. Denktash
demanded that the TRNC be recognized as a
state equal to the Greek-Cypriot side in a
confederation and concluded a declaration of
partial integration with Turkey to parallel
Cyprus’s integration with the EU.  
 Clerides and Denktash participated in
five rounds of U.N.-mediated proximity (indi-
rect) talks beginning in December 1999. On
November 8, 2000, the Secretary General gave
the two leaders his “observations” on sub-
stance and procedure.   In reaction, Denktash
withdrew from talks.  He and Clerides met on
Cyprus on December 4, 2001, and began
holding direct talks on January 16, 2002.   On
November 11, the Secretary General submit-
ted a comprehensive settlement plan based on
Swiss and Belgian models.  Greek Cypriots
and Turkish Cypriots failed to agree on it at an
EU summit in Copenhagen, December 12-13.
Negotiations resumed on January 15, 2003,
with the U.N.  On March 12, Annan an-
nounced that his efforts to get the two sides to
agree to simultaneous referenda on the plan
had failed.  Cyprus signed an accession treaty
to join the EU on April 16.  Denktash opened
the border between the north and south on
April 23.  
Members of Congress have urged the
Administration to be more active, although
they have not proposed an alternative to the
U.N.-sponsored talks.  Some Members seek





On April 23, the Turkish Cypriot administration of northern Cyprus opened the border
with the south.  The (Greek) Cypriot government declared the decision illegal but agreed to
facilitate free movement.  Since then, residents of both sides of the island have made
thousands of crossings.   On April 30, the (Greek) Cypriot government announced a set of
measures to give Turkish Cypriots “the rights and benefits that the Republic of Cyprus offers
its citizens,”  including the facilitation of the movement of goods, persons, and vehicles and
employment of Turkish Cypriots in southern Cyprus, among other steps. (For text, see
[http://www.cyprusembassy.net/article.php?sid=1375&mode=thread&order=0&thold=0].
On May 2, the U.N. Secretary General’s Special Advisor on Cyprus, Peruvian diplomat
Alvaro de Soto, said that the U.N. would not get involved again unless both sides accept the
Secretary General’s plan as a basis for a solution and agree with Greece and Turkey on a
short time frame for reaching an agreement.  Cypriot President Tassos Papadopoulos says
that he is ready to participate in negotiations based on the U.N. plan, which he maintains
should be improved and amended to take into account the April 16 signing of the Treaty of
Accession to the European Union and to create a more viable and workable solution.
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash states “there is nothing to discuss” about the U.N. plan
and adds that de Soto has lost his credibility and reliability.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The island of Cyprus gained its independence from Great Britain in 1960 and has been
divided since 1974.  The 738,000 Cypriots are 76% of Greek ethnic origin, and 19% of
Turkish ethnic origin.  (Less than 5% of the population is Maronites, Armenians, Roman
Catholic Latins, and others.)  At independence, the republic’s constitution defined elaborate
power-sharing arrangements.  It required a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot
vice president; each elected by his own community.  The Treaty of Alliance among the
Republic, Greece, and Turkey provided for 950 Greek and 650 Turkish soldiers to help
defend the island.  The two sides aspired to different futures for Cyprus: most Greek Cypriots
favored union (of the entire island) with Greece (enosis), and Turkish Cypriots preferred
partition of the island (taksim) and uniting a Turkish zone with Turkey.
Cyprus’ success as a new republic lasted from 1960-63.  After President Makarios
proposed constitutional modifications in favor of the majority community in 1963, relations
between the two communities deteriorated, with Turkish Cypriots increasingly consolidating
into enclaves in larger towns.  In 1964, Turkish Cypriots withdrew from most national
institutions and began to administer their own affairs.  Intercommunal violence occurred in
1963-64, and again in 1967.  On both occasions, outside mediation and pressure, including
that by the United States, appeared to prevent Turkey from intervening militarily on behalf
of the Turkish Cypriot community.  Since the 1964 crisis, U.N. peacekeeping troops have
been a buffer between the two communities.
In 1974, the military junta in Athens supported a coup against President Makarios,
replacing him with a hardline supporter of enosis.  Turkey, citing the 1960 Treaty of
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Guarantee as a legal basis for its move, sent troops in two separate actions and, by August
25, was in control of more than 36% of the island.  The military intervention (often called
an invasion) had many byproducts.  Foremost was the widespread dislocation of the Cypriot
population and related refugee and property problems.  The Athens junta  fell, civilian
government was restored in Athens and in Nicosia, Greece withdrew from NATO’s military
command to protest NATO’s failure to prevent Turkey’s action, and Turkey’s civilian
government entered an extended period of instability.  U.S. relations with all parties suffered.
After 1974, Turkish Cypriots emphasized a solution to keep the two communities
separate in two sovereign states or two states in a loose confederation.  In February 1975,
they declared their government the “Turkish Federated State of Cyprus” (TFSC).  In 1983,
Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash declared the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus”
(TRNC) — a move considered by some a unilateral declaration of independence.  Turkish
Cypriots have a constitution and a 50-seat parliament.  Denktash argued that creation of an
independent state was a necessary precondition for a federation with the Greek Cypriots.  He
ruled out a merger with Turkey, and pledged cooperation with U.N. settlement efforts.
Past Settlement Efforts 
After 1974, U.N. negotiations focused on reconciling the two sides’ interests and
reestablishing a central government.  They foundered on definitions of goals and ways to
implement a federal solution.  Turkish Cypriots emphasized bizonality and the political
equality of the two communities.  They prefer two nearly autonomous societies with limited
contact. Greek Cypriots emphasized the three freedoms — movement, property, and
settlement — envisioning a society with free movement of people. The two parties also
differed on the means of achieving a federation: Greek Cypriots want their  internationally
recognized national government to devolve power to the Turkish Cypriots, who would then
join a Cypriot republic.  For the Turkish Cypriots, two entities would join, for the first time,
in a new federation.  These views could affect resolution of property, citizenship of Turkish
settlers, and other legal issues.  Since 1974, there have been many rounds of U.N.- sponsored
direct and indirect negotiations:
1977 Makarios-Denktash Meeting.  Agreed that 1) Cyprus will be an independent,
nonaligned, bicommunal, federal republic; 2) each administration’s control over territory
will be determined in light of economic viability, productivity, and property rights;
3)freedom of movement, settlement, and property will be discussed; and 4) powers and
functions of the central federal government would safeguard the unity of the country.
1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communique.  Agreed to talk on the basis of the 1977
guidelines and address territorial and constitutional issues, giving priority to Varosha,
demilitarization, and to eschew union in whole or part with any other country. 
1984 Proximity Talks.  After the 1983 declaration of the “TRNC,” both sides
proposed confidence-building measures and resolution through a comprehensive framework.
U.N. representatives conducted proximity or indirect talks on constitutional arrangements,
withdrawal of foreign troops, and the status of international treaties and guarantees.
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1985-86 U.N. Draft Framework Exercise.  In January1985, the Turkish Cypriots
accepted a draft U.N. document; Greek Cypriots considered it only a basis for negotiations.
The U.N. modified the document.  Greek Cypriots accepted an April 1985 version; Turkish
Cypriots did not.  Greek Cypriots opposed a March 1986 revision and called for an
international conference or a new summit to revitalize the process.
1988-89 Talks.  After futile informal direct talks, Cypriot President Vassiliou and
Denktash submitted papers that hardened positions.  In April 1989, Secretary General Perez
de Cuellar discouraged the parties from writing positions and proposed separate meetings.
Denktash criticized the approach as substituting proximity talks for direct talks, but the U.N.
believed the parties had agreed to “separate and periodic joint meetings.”  In June, Perez de
Cuellar circulated draft ideas for an agreement.  Turkish Cypriots argued that the U.N. had
exceeded its good offices role; only a document drafted by the parties would be acceptable.
March 1990 - April 1992.  Security Council Res. 649, May 13, 1990, reaffirmed the
Secretary General’s right to make suggestions.  It referred to the federal solution as
bicommunal as regards constitutional aspects and bizonal as regards territorial aspects — the
first U.N. reference to bizonality, a key concept for the Turkish Cypriots.  In June 1991,
Perez de Cuellar called for an international meeting.  On August 2, President Bush
announced that Greece and Turkey had agreed to a U.N. conference on Cyprus.  The
Secretary General insisted that the sides be within range of agreement first.  The Greek and
Turkish Prime Ministers were unable to find common ground.  On October 8, the Secretary
General reported that a conference was not possible and blamed Denktash’s assertion that
each side possessed sovereignty, differing from U.N. resolutions attributing that
characteristic solely to the Republic. 
“Set of Ideas.”  Secretary General Boutros-Ghali’s April 1992 report suggested a
bizonal federation of two politically equal communities, possessing one international
personality and sovereignty.  A bicameral legislature would have a 70:30 ratio of Greek
Cypriots to Turkish Cypriots in the lower house and a 50:50 ratio in the upper house.  7:3
ratio would prevail in the federal executive.  Each state would be guaranteed a majority of
the population and of land in its area.  Non-Cypriot forces not foreseen in the 1960 Treaty
of Alliance would withdraw.  In June, Boutros-Ghali presented a “non-map.”  A new U.N.
draft provided for separate referenda in each community within 30 days of an agreement, an
18-month transitional period, withdrawal of Turkish troops, guarantees consistent with
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe principles, an end of the Greek Cypriot
embargo, free movement, a time-table for the return of Greek Cypriot refugees and their
property, three constitutions (one for each community and one for the central government),
a 7:3 ratio in the executive, vice-presidential veto power (no rotating presidency), an
island-wide referendum on EC membership, and the return of Varosha and about 30 villages
to Greek Cypriots.  Turkish Cypriots would receive assistance and compensation.  Greek
Cypriots would get Morphou.  Denktash said that Turkish Cypriots to be displaced would
total 40,000 or about one-quarter of the north’s population.  Vassiliou estimated that 82,000
Greek Cypriots would be able to return home and that Denktash’s 40,000 figure was inflated.
On August 21, Boutros-Ghali reported that his map provided for two federated states,
the return of many Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriot retention of the coastline and
traditional villages.  He said that Denktash’s territorial proposals were not close to the
“non-map”  and that arrangements would be made for displaced Turkish Cypriots.  Vassiliou
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was depicted as ready to negotiate an agreement based on the map.  Denktash accepted the
right of return and right to property, provided practical difficulties were taken into account.
Boutros-Ghali concluded that an agreement was possible if Turkish Cypriots foresaw
territorial adjustment in line with his map.  Denktash said the report was unacceptable.
S/Res/774, August 26, 1992, endorsed the set of ideas and non-map.  The Secretary
General’s November 19 report implied Denktash’s responsibility for the lack of progress.
A February 14, 1993, election in Cyprus produced a new president, Glafcos Clerides, who
accepted the set of ideas only “in principle.”
Confidence-Building Measures.  On November 19, 1992, the Secretary General
called for confidence-building measures (CBMs) including a reduction of Turkish troops in
exchange for a reduction in defense spending by the Republic of Cyprus; U.N. control of
Varosha; contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; reduced restrictions on
foreign visitors crossing the buffer zone; bicommunal projects; a U.N.-supervised
island-wide census; cooperation in U.N. feasibility studies on resettlement and rehabilitation
of people who would be affected by territorial adjustments.
From May 24 to June 1, 1993, Clerides and Denktash discussed opening Varosha and
reopening Nicosia Airport, which has been under U.N. control but unused since 1974.
Clerides insisted that all of Varosha be handed over, while Denktash wanted to retain about
20% and/or have a U.N. security circle around it and an end to the Greek Cypriot embargo
of northern Cyprus.  Greek Cypriots sought to avoid recognizing the TRNC.  Denktash
claimed that CBMs would benefit Greek Cypriots more than Turkish Cypriots.  However,
U.N. experts determined that both sides would benefit, with relatively greater benefits for
Turkish Cypriots because of their smaller economy and lifting of obstacles facing them. 
On January 28, 1994, Denktash agreed to CBMs in principle.  He later contended that
a March 21 U.N. draft unbalanced equities in the CBMs.   Clerides said that he would accept
the March 21 text if Denktash would.  The Secretary General’s May 30 report, made known
on June 1, insisted that the March draft had not destroyed balance.  Boutros-Ghali blamed
the Turkish Cypriots’ lack of political will for the lack of agreement.  On May 31, Denktash
had said that he would accept the CBMs if improvements agreed to were incorporated.
Clerides would not negotiate beyond the March document.  Boutros-Ghali’s June 28 letter
to the Security Council President concluded that there was sufficient progress to implement
CBMs based on the March paper and clarifications, and said that he intended to address an
identical letter to each leader expressing his intention to proceed and request the Security
Council to endorse the March 21 paper.  Neither side accepted this procedure.
Developments, 1997-2001
On January 4, 1997, Cyprus contracted to purchase Russian S-300 (SA-10) anti-aircraft
missiles with a 90-mile range able to reach southern Turkey, at a cost of about $400 million,
to protect air and naval bases in southern Cyprus to be used by Greece.  The U.S. State
Department criticized the decision.  Turkish officials said that they would not allow the
weapons to be deployed.  The State Department declared that a threat to use force was
unacceptable.  On January 20, Turkish President Demirel and Denktash signed a joint
defense declaration, stating that any attack on the TRNC would be an attack on Turkey. 
IB89140 05-21-03
CRS-5
1997 Talks.  In 1997, U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called for indirect talks
followed by open-ended, face-to-face talks between Clerides and Denktash.   His Special
Representative on Cyprus began indirect talks.  As goodwill gestures, Turkish Cypriots and
Greek Cypriots exchanged visits to holy sites and held bicommunal events and business and
professional meetings.  Greek planes did not overfly Cyprus during joint Greek-Greek
Cypriot military exercises in May 1997 and for the next five months.  Turkish planes did not
overfly Cyprus for as long as Greek aircraft did not do so.  
Clerides and Denktash met under U.N. auspices at Troutbeck, New York, July 9-12, and
in Switzerland, August 11-15.  Beforehand, Denktash said that he would not sign documents
until the European Union (EU) suspended its accession negotiations with the (Greek) Cypriot
government as the sole representative of Cyprus. (See European Union Membership,
below.)   He refused to sign a joint declaration at the end of the talks.  The U.N. Security
Council President said that the Turkish Cypriots’ preconditions had impeded  progress. 
Greece terminated its moratorium on military flights over Cyprus before joint exercises
with Cypriot forces on October 10, 1997.  Turkey ended its parallel moratorium on October
14.   During the exercises, Greek and Turkish warplanes confronted each other over Cyprus,
but neither side fired.  Greece charged that Turkish planes had harassed its defense minister’s
plane.   In October, Turkey conducted exercises in northern Cyprus, including the mock
destruction of missile launchers.
After the December 12, 1997,  EU formal decision to begin accession talks with Cyprus,
Denktash informed the U.N. that “intercommunal talks have ended,” and that he would only
participate in talks between states having equal status. On December 27, the TRNC
suspended all bicommunal activities except religious pilgrimages. 
The military air base at Paphos became operational for use by Greek fighter planes on
January 24, 1998.  The S-300 missiles were intended to protect the base.   The Cypriot
government said that if there were either a demilitarization agreement or substantial progress
toward a settlement, then it would not deploy the S-300s.
On April 23, Denktash and Turkish President Suleyman Demirel issued a communique
calling for negotiations only between sovereign, equal states.  They said that the special
relationship between Turkey and the TRNC would be enhanced in every field. 
 On June 16, Greece sent four F-16 fighter planes and one C-130 cargo plane to Paphos
air base.  Turkey responded on June 18 by sending six F-16's to northern Cyprus. Cypriot
troops completed S-300 training in Russia in July with a test-firing.  Secretary of State
Albright reportedly had asked Clerides to reconsider the S-300 purchase, to store the missiles
outside of Cyprus, or to replace the order with one for shorter range SA-15s.  
On August 31, Denktash proposed a Cyprus Confederation . The Greek Cypriot
government declared the proposal to be “unacceptable.” The U.S. Administration, the U.N.,
and others reiterated that the basis for a settlement is a bizonal, bicommunal federation. 
On December 29, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus.  The EU,
United States, Britain, and the U.N. had provided a face-saving context for his decision.  A
December 14 letter from the Secretary General to the President of the Security Council
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reported that his Special Representative was continuing shuttle talks and that he perceived
a “flexible approach by both sides.”  On December 22, the Security Council approved
S/Res/1217, to renew the UNFICYP mandate, and S/Res/1218, requesting the Secretary
General to work on measures to build trust and cooperation. 
On June 20, 1999, the G-8 summit of leaders of major industrialized countries and
Russia urged the Secretary General to invite the Cypriot leaders to negotiations, without
preconditions.  The Secretary General declared his readiness to do so.  On June 29, the
Security Council passed S/Res/1250, calling upon the two leaders to support a
comprehensive negotiation with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and to negotiate in
good faith until a settlement is reached, with full consideration of all U.N. resolutions and
treaties.  S/Res/1251 said that the goal is a Cyprus with a single sovereignty that comprises
two politically equal communities in a bicommunal, bizonal federation. 
During Greek-Greek Cypriot annual military exercise from October 2-7,1999, no Greek
planes landed at the Paphos air base; there were no incidents involving Greek and Turkish
planes; and Turkey’s objections to the exercise were milder than in previous years. 
1999-2001 Proximity Talks. Secretary  General Annan and his Special Advisor on
Cyprus, Peruvian diplomat Alvaro de Soto, began proximity talks with Clerides and
Denktash in New York from December 3 to 14.  In U.N. Security Council Resolution 1283
(December 15, 1999), the Council reaffirmed “all its relevant resolutions on Cyprus,”
without specifying that a bizonal, bicommunal federation with a single sovereignty on the
island is its goal. Annan submitted an addendum, noting “The Government of Turkey has
indicated that it concurs with ... the position of the Turkish Cypriot party, namely that
UNFICYP can operate on both sides of the island only on the basis of the consent of both
parties and that the Turkish Cypriot authorities will accordingly request UNFICYP to work
with them to develop modalities of UNFICYP’s operation in northern Cyprus.”   The Turkish
Cypriots interpreted the wording as a move toward recognition of their state, and the Greek
Cypriots were upset with this Turkish Cypriot view.  A second round of proximity talks was
held in Geneva, January 31-February 8, 2000.  Bicommunal contacts among political parties,
journalists, businessmen, and environmentalists resumed. 
The Cypriot and Greek governments prevented an addendum similar to that of
December 1999 in U.N. Security Council Resolution 1303, June 15, 2000.  Denktash then
linked his attendance at talks to measures that would prove that UNFICYP needs Turkish
Cypriot cooperation to fulfill its mission.  He constrained UNFICYP activities in the north
and Turkish forces set up a three-man checkpoint outside Strovilia, a small Greek Cypriot
village in the no-man’s land separating the Turkish-Cypriot-administered area and a British
base, where UNFICYP forces cross between north and south, blocking UNFICYP access. 
A third round of talks was held from July 24 to August 4.  At the outset of a fourth
round, September 12 to 26, Annan said that he had concluded that the equal status of the
parties “must and should be recognized” explicitly in a comprehensive settlement, noting that
in the negotiations each represents its side and no one else, as the political equal of the other.
Clerides boycotted the talks in protest until assured that they would take into account U.N.
resolutions that call for a federal solution.  Denktash was pleased with Annan’s remarks.  
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During Greek-Greek Cypriot military exercises from October 19 to 23, Greek and
Turkish planes engaged in mock dogfights.  Greek planes landed at Paphos air base, and
Greek Cypriot National Guard TOR-M1 anti-aircraft missiles deployed at Paphos locked
onto Turkish F-16 fighter planes.  Turkish planes landed on the island during Turkish-
Turkish Cypriot exercises in November. 
A fifth round of talks was held from November 1 to 10.  On November 8, Annan gave
his “assessment.”  Media leaks and statements by the parties suggest that he called for one
sovereign, indissoluble, common state with a single international legal personality; common
state law would overrule regional law; political equality would be defined as effective
“participation” in government, not numerically; component states would be to a great extent
self-governed; the return of an “appreciable amount of territory” to Greek Cypriots, with as
little dislocation of Turkish Cypriots as possible and return of as many Greek Cypriots as
possible; and a security regime including an international military force, police, and a
political mechanism.  Clerides welcomed these views.  Denktash rejected them and, at a
November 24 “summit” with Turkey’s President, Prime Minister, Chief of the Armed Forces
General Staff, and other high officials,  announced his withdrawal from the talks because no
progress could be made until two separate states are recognized.  Turkey supported his
decision. Denktash refused to participate in a sixth round of talks in January 2001, labeling
the Secretary General’s November 2000 assessment an unacceptable precondition.
On September 5, 2001, de Soto said that Annan had invited the two leaders to hold
separate meetings with him on September 12 in New York.  De Soto hoped that the meetings
would be followed by separate working meetings with him.  Clerides accepted.  Denktash
did not because, “The necessary foundation has not been established.” Denktash proposed
a secret face-to-face meeting with Clerides, but de Soto did not think it was a good idea. 
On December 4, Clerides and Denktash met for the first time since August 1997.  De
Soto also was present.  The two leaders agreed to begin direct talks with no preconditions,
all issues on the table, and to continue until a comprehensive settlement is achieved.
Clerides became the first Cypriot president to travel to the north since 1974 on December 5,
when he attended a dinner at Denktash’s residence. Denktash reciprocated by visiting
Clerides’ private home for dinner on December 29.
Developments, 2002-2003
On January 16, 2002, Clerides and Denktash met in de Soto’s presence and agreed to
hold intensive peace talks beginning January 21 at the Nicosia airport, a U.N. base.  Ground
rules provided that there would be no final agreement until all issues were agreed upon.
On April 29, Denktash proposed a Partnership State to be founded by the two now-
existing states on Cyprus.  Each partner would retain authority over its domestic affairs.
Together, they would set up a 12-member Council consisting of two presidents and five
representatives from each side.  Each president would chair the Council for 2 years.  Council
members would hold portfolios for foreign affairs, economy, and EU relations.  A joint
parliament would have an equal number of members from each side.  Denktash insisted that
the Turkish security guarantee continue.  The situation would be reviewed in 5 years, when
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new authorities could be given to the partnership.  Clerides’ spokesman charged that these
views contravened U.N. resolutions. 
Secretary General Annan visited Cyprus, May 14-16.  In continuing talks, Denktash
proposed discussing ideas from the Belgian constitution; Clerides offered to discuss the
entire document.  On September 6, Annan met the two leaders in Paris.  He noted that
“though serious differences remain, the elements of a comprehensive settlement that would
meet the basic needs of both sides do, in fact, exist,” and “that the gaps dividing the parties
can be bridged.”  Clerides observed, however, “there appears to be no way of approach” on
the issue of sovereignty and whether there will be a new state or a continuation of the
Republic of Cyprus. On September 16, Denktash submitted revisions of his April 29 ideas,
strengthening central government authority to address Clerides’ objections but retaining the
concept of a new partnership state.  He proposed Belgium as a model for foreign affairs and
Switzerland as a model for domestic affairs.
Annan met with Clerides and Denktash in New York on October 3-4.  The two agreed
to establish bilateral technical committees to deal with international treaties and legislation
to be in effect in the common state. Clerides said that “huge differences” about sovereignty
prevented discussion of other issues.  Annan noted, “A comprehensive settlement has to be
a complex, integrated, legally binding and self-executing agreement, where the rights and
obligations of all concerned are clear, unambiguous and not subject to further negotiations.”
Denktash underwent open-heart surgery on October 7.  On October 26, Greece and Turkey
agreed to postpone their respective November military exercises on Cyprus.
November 11, 2002 Settlement Plan.  Secretary General Kofi Annan presented
a comprehensive plan for a Cyprus settlement: Basis for Agreement on a Comprehensive
Settlement of the Cyprus Problem, presented by the Secretary General.   It called for a “new
state of affairs” in Cyprus, in which the “common state” government’s relations with its two
politically equal component states would be modeled on the Swiss federal example.  It would
have a single international legal personality.  Component states would participate in the
formulation and implementation of policy in foreign and European Union relations modeled
on the Belgian example.  Parliament would have two 48-seat houses. Each state would have
equal representation in the Senate. Seats in the Chamber of Deputies would be allocated in
proportion to population, provided that no state would have less than 25% of the seats.  A
Presidential Council would have 6 members.  The offices of President and Vice President
would rotate every 10 months among members of the Council.  No more than two
consecutive presidents could come from the same state.  Greek and Turkish troops could not
exceed a four-digit figure (9,999).  U.N. peacekeepers would remain as long as the common
state, with the concurrence of the component states, decides.  Cyprus would be demilitarized.
A Supreme Court would have nine judges: three Greek Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot, and
three non-Cypriot.  During a three-year transition, the leaders of the two sides would be co-
presidents. The 1960 Treaties of Establishment, Guarantee, and Alliance would remain in
force.  There would be a single Cypriot citizenship and citizenship of a component state;
residence in a component state could be limited by citizenship, but such limits would have
restrictions.  There would be provisions for return or compensation of property.  Two maps
of territorial adjustments reduced Turkish Cypriot territory to 28.5% of the island. 
On December 5, Clerides and Denktash submitted comments.  Greek Cypriot concerns
included power-sharing, the length of the transition period, insufficient Greek Cypriot
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repatriation, and the large Turkish settler population.  Turkish Cypriots criticized sovereignty
provisions,  the loss of water resources and  territory, which would make many Turkish
Cypriots refugees, and the return of Greek Cypriot refugees. On December 10, Annan
presented a revised peace plan. Changes reduced the number of foreign troops and settlers
allowed to remain, increased the number of Greek Cypriot refugees allowed to return, but
reduced the numbers moving into Turkish Cypriot territory.  The Secretary General asked
both sides to be available in Copenhagen during the EU summit.  Clerides and his National
Council went to Denmark, but Denktash went to Ankara for medical care and sent his
“foreign minister.” Annan had wanted a Founding Agreement of a “common state” signed
by December 12, but it was not.  He then hoped for a conclusion by February 28, 2003, with
simultaneous referenda to be held by both sides on March 30.    
Large demonstrations of Turkish Cypriots in favor of EU membership for a reunified
island, negotiations for a settlement based on the U.N. plan, and Denktash’s resignation
occurred in November and December 2002, and  January and February 2003.  On January
2, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Chairman of the ruling party in Turkey, stressed the need to heed
the wishes of the people, and declared,  “I’m not in favor of the continuation of the policy
that has been maintained on Cyprus over the past 30 to 40 years....  This is not Mr.
Denktash’s private matter.”  On January 8, the Turkish Armed Forces Deputy Chief of Staff
charged, “Injustices are being committed against Mr. Denktash, both in Turkey and on
Cyprus.”  The General criticized elements of the U.N. plan, including its maps.  Denktash
and Clerides resumed negotiations on January 15. 
During a visit to Cyprus on January 27, Turkish Land Forces Commander General
Aytac Yalman expressed concern that a solution based on the U.N. plan would lead to
clashes similar to those after 1963 and pledged to protect the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey’s
rights on the island.  After he visited the island the next day, Turkish Foreign Minister Yakis
said that Turkey would not accept anything that the TRNC would not accept.
Clerides and Denktash held talks until mid-February. On February 21, Greece and
Turkey began talks on how many troops would remain on the island, where they would be
deployed, and how they will be armed.  Annan traveled to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, and
presented his third revised plan on February 26. (For text, see the Republic of Cyprus site at
[http://www.pio.gov.cy/other/final_un_plan.htm].)    It included a British offer to transfer 45
square miles or almost half of its sovereign base areas to Cyprus, 90% to the Greek Cypriots
and 10% to the Turkish Cypriots, if the two sides agree to the plan.  The revisions allowed
Turkish Cypriots to retain the Karpass Peninsula, with Greek Cypriots settling there.  Turkish
Cypriot territory would decrease  to 28.2%, and the number of Greek Cypriots returning
north would increase to 92,000, but be capped at 21% of the population of the region at the
end of 15 years, and the number of Turkish settlers allowed to remain on the island also
would increase.  Annan requested that Denktash and newly elected President of Cyprus
Tassos Papadopoulos permit separate, simultaneous referenda on March 30 on the plan.
On March 10, Annan met Papadopoulos and Denktash in The Hague to get their
responses to his request for referenda on March 30 on the Foundation Agreement or his
settlement plan.  On  March 11, Annan announced that his efforts had been unsuccessful.
He stated that Papadopoulos wished to be sure that gaps regarding federal legislation and
constituent state constitutions would be filled, and that Greece and Turkey would commit to
security provisions.  Papadopoulos also felt that more time was needed for a campaign on
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the referendum.  Papadopoulos was prepared not to reopen substantive provisions of the plan
if Denktash did the same.  Denktash was not prepared to put the plan to a referendum.  He
had fundamental objections to the plan’s basic points and believed that further negotiations
should begin on a new starting point and that the parties had to agree on basic principles.
Annan suggested that negotiations continue until March 28 and that the referenda be held on
April 6.  This did not sway the parties.  Annan announced, “we have reached the end of the
road” and that it was not possible to achieve a comprehensive settlement before Cyprus signs
the accession treaty to become a member of the European Union on April 16.  Afterward,
Papadopoulos said that he had said yes to a referendum as long as the documents required
for the whole package were ready in time, especially legislation related to the functioning of
the government of the common state.  Denktash said the “plan is not acceptable.”
Annan’s April 1 report to the Security Council, released on April 5, said that Denktash
“bears prime responsibility” for the failure of the U.N. effort. (Available on the U.N. site at
[http://ods-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/305/59/PDF/N0330559.pdf?OpenElem
ent].)  Security Council Resolution 1575, April 14, 2003 also stated that an agreement had
not been possible “due to the negative approach of the Turkish Cypriot leader” and referred
to the Annan plan “as a unique basis for further negotiations.”  
On March 28, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan proposed a conference on Cyprus to be
attended by Turkish Cypriots, Greek Cypriots, Turkey, Greece, and Britain. Greece and the
(Greek) Cypriot government rejected the idea, insisting that the settlement process remain
within the U.N. framework.  On April 2, Denktash wrote to Papadopoulos offering six
confidence-building measures: 1) a part of Varosha would be transferred to Greek Cypriot
control for settlement, 2) all restrictions on overseas trade, transport, travel, cultural, and
ports activities in both parts of Cyprus would be lifted, 3) freedom of movement would be
facilitated between the two sides, including movement of tourists, 4) steps would be taken
to normalize the flow of goods between the two sides, and cooperation between institutions
would be encouraged, 5) Turkish Cypriots would lift restrictions imposed in July 2000 on
UNFICYP, and 6) a bilateral reconciliation committee would be established.  Denktash said
that he was willing to discuss how the U.N. and European Union could assist in
implementation, and how a settlement and other matters related to EU membership.   On
April 18, the Secretary General stated that amendments could be made to the plan, “but the
plan itself must be accepted as a basis for negotiating first.”  
 
Established Positions of the Parties on Key Issues
(Greek Cypriot positions are on the left; Turkish Cypriot positions are on the right.)
Sovereignty and Powers
Greek Cypriots say that bicommunal, bizonal
federation of two states with one sovereignty
should be established. A new federal
constitution should come first, specifying the
powers of the central government and those
of the self administered states.
The Turkish Cypriots say that each
community should form a sovereign state as
equals and join in a “partnership state,”which





The President will be elected by a common
vote from Greek Cypriots and Turkish
Cypriots, but must have votes from the other
community.
A rotating presidency will prevent one
community retaining control of the  office.
Each community separately must elect its
own representative to fill the office of
president or vice president.
Territory
The Greek Cypriots accepted the map in the
U.N. set of ideas, subject to marginal
changes.  Turkish Cypriot territory on the
island must fall under 29+% (optimally to
24%) to allow the maximum number of
Greek Cypriot refugees to remain under
Greek Cypriot administration.
The Turkish Cypriots rejected the map
included in the U.N. set of ideas.  Denktash
would not discuss territory before Turkish
Cypriot sovereignty is accepted, adding that
Turkish Cypriots have a “right” to more than
33% of the island.
Security/Turkish Troops/Guarantees
The island should be demilitarized.  A
permanent U.N. force should oversee
implementation of a settlement accord.  No
Turkish guarantee. 
The 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, whereby
Turkey rightfully protects the Turkish
Cypriot community, must not be diluted.
Turkish troop presence may be reduced if
Turkey retains its Treaty rights.  Agrees that
island should be demilitarized.  A U.N. force
may stay after a settlement, but without
permanent status which would contradict
sovereignty. 
Displaced Persons and Property Rights
A majority of the Greek Cypriot refugees
must return to their homes under local Greek
Cypriot administration; remaining refugees
must have the right to return.  Turkish
Cypriots cannot be compensated for property
they did not own in 1974.  Turkish Cypriots
may opt to return to properties they owned in
the south in 1974 or to be compensated for
them at 1974 values plus inflation.  All
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled will be
c o m p e n s a t e d .  T u r k i s h  C y p r i o t
misappropriation of Greek Cypriot properties
is null and void.  More recently, the
European Union requires free movement of
people and purchase of property; therefore,
exchange of property and compensation will
be on a voluntary basis.
The population exchange cannot be reversed.
Turkish Cypriots to be resettled should be
compensated at the current value for the
property they occupy at the time of
resettlement.  Greek Cypriots unable to
return to property they owned in 1974 will be
compensated from the sale of Turkish
Cypriot property in the south.  The Turkish
Cypriot property in the south roughly equals
the Greek Cypriot property in the north.
Deeds to Greek Cypriot properties in the
north allocated to Turkish Cypriots in the
north since 1974 are legally valid.  A Joint
Property Claims Commission should be
formed to inventory property on both sides of
the island, determine value, and seek
resources to pay compensation.
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Other Factors Affecting the Talks
The Cyprus talks have been vulnerable to changes in the atmosphere between the two
communities and within each community and to factors not part of the talks. 
Domestic Politics in Cyprus
In the south, Democratic Rally (DISY) leader Clerides was elected President of the
Republic of Cyprus in February 1993 and reelected in February 1997.  The February 16,
2003, presidential election was won by  Tassos Papadopoulos, the candidate of his right-wing
Democratic Party (DIKO), the Reformist Party of Working People (AKEL/communist party
that supports accession to the EU and has engaged leftist parties of the north), the Social
Democratic Movement (KISOS), and the Greens.  (Papadopoulos is a controversial
nationalist whose law firm represented Serbian enterprises and allegedly helped them
establish front companies on Cyprus to violate U.N. sanctions on the former Yugoslavia.  He
was on the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control list of “blocked persons” until 1995, when
sanctions were lifted.)   May 28, 2001 parliamentary elections had produced a narrow victory
for AKEL, which received 34.71% of the vote and 20 seats in the 50-seat parliament.  DISY
dropped to second place with 34% of the vote and 19 seats.  DIKO won 14.84% of the vote
and 9 seats; KISOS, with 6.51% of the vote, holds 4 seats.  Four other parties also won seats.
Dimitris Christofias, AKEL’s leader, is speaker of parliament, the second highest
government official and acts for the president when he is absent or incapacitated.  There is
no vice president because the 1960 Constitution reserves the post for a Turkish Cypriot.  
Denktash has led northern Cyprus since 1975, was elected “President” of the TRNC in
1983, and reelected subsequently. On April 15, 2000, Denktash won 43% of the vote to 30%
for Dervis Eroglu in the first round of the election for “President.”  Eroglu withdrew before
a second round, and Denktash was declared “President” again. In December 6, 1998,
elections for the 50-seat parliament, the National Unity Party (UBP) had won 24 seats; the
Democratic Party (DP) 13; Communal Liberation Party (TKP) 7; and Republican Turkish
Party (CTP) 6.  Eroglu became Prime Minister and formed a coalition with the TKP.  Eroglu
increasingly disagreed with his TKP Deputy Prime Minister, Mustafa Akinci, who criticized
Denktash’s withdrawal from the U.N. talks and non-participation in EU membership
negotiations, and Turkey’s influence over TRNC affairs. On May 19, 2001, the National
Popular Movement (UHH) announced its formation, vowing to strengthen ties with Turkey
and to struggle against “foreign forces and local collaborators.” A Denktash adviser is a UHH
founder, and Denktash supports it.  On May 24, the UBP withdrew from the coalition with
the TKP.  On the same day, the headquarters of a newspaper critical of Denktash was
bombed.  On June 5, Eroglu formed a new government with the DP. In June 30, 2002, local
elections, UBP won 16 out of 28 mayoral posts, but the pro-settlement, pro-EU CTP, led by
Mehmet Ali Talat, won Nicosia, Kyrenia, and Famagusta and polled second overall.  
Policies of Greece and Turkey
The “motherlands,” Greece and Turkey, have widely different approaches to the Cyprus
problem.  They defend and protect their ethnic kin, and their bilateral relations, strained over
Aegean Sea issues, have been harmed because of Cyprus.  
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 On November 16, 1993, Greek Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and Clerides
agreed to a joint defense doctrine whereby their governments would decide on the Cyprus
issue jointly, Greece would include Cyprus in its defense plan, and any Turkish advance
would lead to war between Greece and Turkey.  Clerides announced in April 1994 that
Greece would provide air cover for Cyprus, while Cypriot bases would prepare to refuel
Greek Air Force planes, a naval base would be set up, and elite troops would bolster land
forces.  In January 1996, Costas Simitis succeeded Papandreou and retained the doctrine. 
Turkish governments have argued that the Cyprus problem is not acute because Turkish
Cypriot security has been ensured since 1974, and that dialogue is the appropriate channel
for resolution.  Turks support their armed forces on the island and agree that they should not
withdraw until Turkish Cypriots’ rights are guaranteed effectively.   The current Justice and
Development Party (AKP) government in Ankara maintains that no solution is not a solution.
Turkey provides aid to the TRNC. 
In July 1999, Greece and Turkey began a dialogue on  “lesser” issues, excluding Cyprus
and the Aegean, that eventually led to bilateral accords.  The rapprochement accelerated after
earthquakes in both countries produced mutual sympathy and good will.  Greece’s decision
to allow the EU to affirm Turkey’s membership candidacy that December confirmed a
change in relations.  Greece still champions Turkey’s cause in the EU.  On November 2,
2000, Papandreou asserted that the most basic precondition for a full rapprochement is the
solution of the Cyprus problem based on U.N. resolutions.  On March 12, 2002, Athens and
Ankara began exploratory talks on the Aegean Sea issues. 
European Union Membership
A customs agreement between Cyprus and the European Community (EC) came into
force in 1988.  On July 4, 1990, Cyprus applied for EC membership, stating that it would
welcome Turkish Cypriot participation in technical negotiations.  Turkish Cypriots objected
because EC acceptance of the application recognized the Republic’s government and not
their own.  Greece’s EC membership and Turkey’s lack thereof led Turks and Turkish
Cypriots to view increased EC involvement in Cyprus as favoring Greek Cypriots.    
The EU was to fix a date for Cyprus membership accession negotiations in January
1995.  The EU preferred a prior intercommunal solution, but was willing to begin
negotiations without one.  In December 1994, Greece had vetoed an EU-Turkey customs
union and some Europeans demanded that the veto be lifted before Cyprus’s application was
addressed.  On March 6, 1995, the EU separately ratified the customs union accord and
scheduled accession talks with Cyprus.  At Greece’s insistence, the Republic is the EU’s
interlocutor.   Turkey said that if Greek Cypriots were admitted into the EU as the Cyprus
government, then Turkey would integrate with the “TRNC” to the same degree.  Denktash
asserted that if Cyprus becomes an EU member while Turkey is not a member, then it would
weaken Turkey’s guarantees and mean surrogate union between Greece and Cyprus.  
On July 10, 1997, the European Commission reconfirmed that membership talks with
Cyprus would open in 1998.  On July 20, then Turkish Deputy Prime Minister Ecevit and
Denktash issued a joint declaration, noting the July 10 statement and calling for a process of
partial integration between Turkey and TRNC to parallel that of Cyprus and the EU.
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Denktash ended contacts with the EU because they “legitimize” an accession process
initiated “illegally” by the Greek Cypriots. 
Clerides said that Turkish Cypriots could participate as full members of the negotiating
team for accession if they accept the idea of EU membership and if their participation did not
suggest recognition of the TRNC. On September 25, 1997, then Greek Deputy Foreign
Minister Papandreou said that Greece would block the EU’s expansion eastward if Cyprus
were not accepted because it is divided.  France withdrew its objection to accession talks
with a  divided Cyprus when Greece withdrew its objection to talks with East European
candidates.  On June 12, 1998, France reiterated its opposition.  On November 9, the French,
German, Dutch, and Italian foreign ministers warned of difficulties linked to accession talks
with a divided island.  Greece again warned that it would block EU expansion if Cyprus were
excluded.  On November 10,  the EU began substantive accession negotiations with Cyprus.
On May 14, 1999, then Greek Alternate Foreign Minister Kranidiotis declared, “It is
clear that Cyprus can become a member of the EU even if the Cyprus problem is not
solved.... “  On July 10, he said that Greece would not object to Turkey’s EU membership
candidacy if assured that Cyprus’s accession would go ahead even without a resolution.
Turkey rejects linkage between the Cyprus issue and its candidacy.  
The EU Helsinki summit’s conclusions on December 10, 1999, “underline(d) that a
political settlement will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union.  If no
settlement has been achieved by the completion of accession negotiations, the ... decision on
accession will be made without the above (i.e., a settlement) being a precondition.  In this
the Council will take account of all relevant factors.”  The summit also affirmed Turkey’s
EU candidacy.  
In November 2001, the European Commission said that it would support any
constitutional arrangements the two sides reached in a settlement, provided that Cyprus was
“able to speak with one voice in the EU decision-making process.”  On June 22, the EU
Presidency called upon the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders to reach a settlement
before the conclusion of accession talks between the EU and Cyprus. The EU then would
accommodate the terms of a settlement in the Treaty of Accession.  
At its summit in Copenhagen in December 2002, the EU concluded accession talks with
Cyprus.  The EU and NATO reached an agreement on EU use of NATO assets at the
summit, part of which stipulates that Cyprus will not take part in EU military operations
conducted using NATO assets once it becomes an EU member because it is not a member
of NATO nor of NATO’s Partnership for Peace.  The European Commission said that it
would organize an international donors’ meeting for northern Cyprus when a settlement is
reached. 
On March 12, the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement said, “the breakdown of the
U.N. talks is an obstacle for Turkey on the path to the EU.”  Cypriot Foreign Minister
Iakovou said that he believed that Turkey’s application will be judged not only by the
Copenhagen criteria (applicable to all candidates) but also the Maastricht criteria, the
Helsinki provisions, and a solution of the Cyprus problem. 
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Cyprus signed the Treaty of Accession to the EU on April 16, 2003, to become an EU
member on May 1, 2004.  An attached Protocol suspends the application of the acquis
communautaire (body of EU law) to those areas “in which the government of the Republic
of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.” 
U.N. Peacekeeping Forces
The United Nations has had forces on Cyprus since 1964.  The size of UNFICYP (U.N.
Forces in Cyprus) is now 1,209 troops and 35 civilian police, with 15 countries participating.
On April 2, 1993, the Secretary General urged a change in financing from having costs borne
by UNFICYP participating countries, contributions, and assessments to assessments.  On
May 27, the Council agreed that costs not covered by contributions would be treated as U.N.
expenses.  UNFICYP cost about $45.6 million for the period from July 2002 through June
2003.  The government of Cyprus contributes one-third of the cost and the government of
Greece contributes $6.5 million annually; the rest comes out of assessments.
U.S. Policy
Since 1974, the United States has supported U.N. negotiations to achieve a settlement.
The 1974-1978 period was marked by sharp divisions between the Ford and Carter
Administrations and Congress over Turkey’s role on Cyprus.  A congressionally mandated
arms embargo was in place against Turkey until September 1978.  In general, Congress
favored measures to pressure Turkey to withdraw its troops and encourage concessions by
Denktash, while successive administrations argued that pressures were counterproductive
and preferred diplomacy.  Although Members did not propose an alternative to the U.N.
talks, they sought an active U.S. role.  In response, President Reagan created the State
Department post of Special Cyprus Coordinator, and President Clinton named a Presidential
Envoy for Cyprus.  The Bush Administration did not fill the position of Presidential Envoy.
On February 14, 2001, Secretary of State Powell affirmed that the Administration “fully
supports the ongoing U.N. efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement” and declared “the
U.S. will also remain engaged in efforts to facilitate a just and lasting settlement of the
Cyprus issue.”  The United States supports the accession of Cyprus to the EU.  S.Con.Res.
122, November 18, 2002, supported Cyprus’ EU membership.  The Administration strongly
supported the U.N.’s 2002 settlement plan and its revised versions.
Since 1978, Congress has appropriated $14 million or $15 million for scholarships,
bicommunal projects and measures aimed at reunifying the island, reducing tensions, and
promoting peace and cooperation between the two communities.   The United States has been
the principal donor for bicommunal projects.   The Administration has requested $7.5 million
for FY2004.  In January 2003, the U.S. State Department’s Special Cyprus Coordinator said
that the United States would do whatever is necessary to ensure that funds are ready for the
implementation of an agreement.  On January 20, Denktash claimed that he had received an
offer of U.S. financial aid to help Turkish Cypriots who might be displaced under the U.N.
settlement plan.  He suggested that Washington offer the money instead as compensation to
Greek Cypriots if they agreed to stay in the south.  He also questioned whether Congress
would approve the funds.  The State Department said, on January 24, 2003, that it is prepared
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to participate in an international donors’ conference and to contribute financially in the
context of a comprehensive settlement.
LEGISLATION
H.Res. 165 (Bereuter) Expresses support for a renewed effort to find a peaceful, just,
and lasting settlement for the Cyprus problem.  Introduced on March 27, 2003.  Passed by
a vote of 422-0 on April 10, 2003.
 
